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I. INTRODUCTION 
As has been stated in the earlier briefing on appeal, this case arises from the conveyance 
of 21.54 acres of real property ("the Property") from Respondent Brighton Investments, LLC 
("Brighton") to Boise State University ("BSU") for the known purpose of ultimately trading the 
same property to the Independent School District of Boise ("the School District") so that the 
School District could construct a new junior high school facility on the Property. The Property 
was originally owned by Appellant Harris Family Limited Partnership ("Hanis"), which also 
owns and/or has an interest in other properties and developments near the Property. (R. Vol. I, 
pp. 42-43, f[ 3; Harris's Counterclaim to the School District's Complaint for Condemnation.) 
Pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement between Harris and Brighton, the Property was to 
he encumbered by certain Post-Closing Agreements (collectively, "Restrictive Covcnants") that 
were to limit future development of the property to a "manner consistent with . . . the Spring 
Creelc and/or Mill District developments" (R. ~xhibit '  1, pp. 2-3,v 9, Ex. 8; Affidavit of Counsel 
in Opposition to Boise School District's Motion for Order Granting Immediate Condemnation of 
Restrictive Covenants and Defendant's Right to Enforce Same ("Simmons Aff.")), which was 
!mown to all parties involved to restrict the Property to solely "residential development" 
(R. Exhibit 1, p. 3 , l  11, Ex. lo; Simmons Aff.). Brighton's sale of the Property to BSU for the 
known purpose of constructing the new junior high school, whether that construction was to be 
Citations herein to "R. Exhibit " refer to the numbered exhibits to the Record on Appeal, as 
listed on the District Court Clerk's "Certificate of Exhibits," R. Vol. 11, pp. 421-422A. 
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accomplished by way of contract or condemnation, had the effect of nullifying tlie Restrictive 
Covenants in their entirety. 
The key issues in this appeal center around: (1) The nature and content of the Restrictive 
Covenants contained within the parties' Purchase and Sale Agreement and subsequently 
recorded Memorandum of Agreement (R. Exhibit 1, pp. 2-3, ll 8-9, Exs. 7 and 8; Simmons 
Aff.); (2) The constitutional right to enter into a contractual relationship, including one giving 
rise to restrictive covenants, without having that relationship disturbed or destroyed by the 
eminent domain power of the government (R. Exhibit 6, pp. 6-7); (3) The validity of an 
independent cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is not 
grounded on a breach of an express term of a contract (R. Vol. 11, pp. 267-268, W 35-38); and (4) 
The legal and factual distinctions between Harris's claim for severance damages from the School 
District and its additional claim for damages from Brighton based on unjust enrichment 
(Compare R. Vol. I, p. 4 3 , l  5 (Harris's counterclaim against the School District for "severance 
damage to the remaining real property owned by" Harris) with R. Vol. 11, pp. 274-275,ll 62-67 
(Harris's third party claim against Brighton for unjust enrichment for the "substantial difference 
between the . . . purchase and sale price of the subject real property . . . [which] resulted in a 
substantial windfall to" Brighton)). A review of Respondent's Brief evidences several, 
fundamental misunderstandings regarding the aforementioned issues, both in the proceedings 
below and on appeal. 
Ill 
I// 
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11. ARGUMENT 
A. Harris Has A Valid Cause Of Action For Breach Of Contract Against Brighton. 
Lost in Brighton's arguments on appeal is the traditional legal standard for contract 
interpretation. Throughout its brief, Brighton repeatedly emphasizes the need for restrictive 
covenants to be expressly stated in order to be valid and binding in the state of Idaho. (See, e.g., 
Respondent's Brief, p. 19.) Important to note, however, is the fact that Brighton did not, at any 
point in the proceedings below, previously argue that the express terms of the Restrictive 
Covenants do not contain a restriction to solely residential development, as is now contended. 
(Id.) While the record is replete with Brighton's arguments that the terms of the Restrictive 
Covenants did not place an express restraint on alienatzon (see, e.g., R. Exhibit 3, p. 6;  
Memorandum in Support of Brighton Investments LLC's Motion to Dismiss ("Brighton's 
Dismissal Memo.")), the primary argument now raised by Brighton is nowhere to be found 
below. 
Even at oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss, Brighton focused entirely on whether 
the terms of the Restrictive Covenants restrained alienation, and not whether the terms limited 
the property to residential use. ( T ,  p. 912-11. Brighton failed to argue against the limitation 
for residential purposes, even though Harris's Third Party Complaint made specific reference to 
that limitation in the counts relating to Brighton's alleged breach of contract. (R. Vol. I, pp. 83- 
85.) "It is by now a well established rule in Idaho that review on appeal is limited to those issues 
raised before the lower tribunal and that an appellate court will not decide issues presented for 
the first time on appeal." Balser v. Kootenai County Bd. of Comm 'rs, 110 Idaho 37, 714 P.2d 6 
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(1986). Because Brighton failed to argue against the Restrictive Covenants' limitation to 
residential use, these arguments (and all implications used throughout Brighton's other 
arguments) ought to be disregarded on appeal. 
Notwithstanding Brighton's failure to argue below whether the Restrictive Covenants 
limited the development of the Property to residences, the circumstances surrounding the 
Purchase and Sale Agreement evidence that both Harris and Brighton intended for future 
development of the Property to be restricted to residential use. Contrary to Brighton's assertion, 
"[Ilt is an established rule that mere ambiguity of a restrictive covenant does not render it void or 
unenforceable." Thomas v. Campbell, 107 Idaho 398, 404, 690 P.2d 333, 339 (1984) (citing 
Alloway v. Moyer, 275 Or. 397, 550 P.2d 1379 (Or. 1976)). "When a court interprets a 
restrictive covenant, it is to apply generally the same rules of construction as are applied to any 
contract or covenant." Brown v. Perlnns, 129 Idaho 189, 192, 923 P.2d 434,437 (1996) (citing 
Sun Valley Ctr. v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 41 1,413,690 P.2d 346, 348 (1984)). "[Wlhere the 
terms of a contract are ambiguous, the interpretation of the contract's meaning is a question of 
fact." Id. (citing St. Clair v. Krueger, 115 Idaho 702, 704, 769 P.2d 579, 581 (1989)). Further, 
"[iln interpreting any provisions of a contract or restrictive covenant, the entire agreement must 
be viewed as a whole." Id. "Once a restrictive covenant has been determined to be ambiguous, 
the court must determine the intent of the parties at the time the instrument was drafted, gathered 
from the language used and the circumstances which existed at its formulation." Thomas, 107 
Idaho at 404. 
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In this case, Brighton has made no argument on appeal, nor throughout the proceedings 
below, that the intention ofthe parties was anything other than to maintain the residential nature 
of the property, consistent with the theme of the nearby Spring Creek and Mill District 
developments. Because the District Court made no assessment as to the intention of the parties 
at the time that the Restrictive Covenants were drafted, it is not appropriate for this Court to do 
so now. Balser, 110 Idaho at 40. 
Nonetheless, the evidence before the District Court clearly established that the intention 
of the parties was to limit development of the property solely to residential development. 
(R. Exhibit 1, p. 3, 7 11, Ex. 10; Simmons Aff.) By Brighton's own admissions (through its 
member and agent, David Turnbull), "[tlhere is a provision in purchase agreement [sic] between 
Harris and Brighton that effects [sic] the proposed school site. . . . Essentially, the property was 
anticipated to be residential development similar to . . . Spring Creek or Mill District." (Id. 
(emphasis added).) When raised at the proper time, upon remand, the evidence will show that 
the parties knowingly intended to restrict development of the property to residential use. Once 
that fact is established, it will be a question of fact for the jury to determine whether Brighton's 
actions, in selling the Property to an entity for a known purpose that was contrary to the 
Restrictive Covenants, constituted a material breach of those Restrictive Covenants. First Sec. 
Bankofldaho, N.A. v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787,792,964 P.2d 654,659 (1998). 
Given the foregoing, this case should be remanded to the District Court to determine 
whether the Restrictive Covenants include an express limitation on development of the property, 
as Harris contends that they do, and to determine at trial whether Brighton's actions, in 
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knowingly conveying the property to an entity that would not use the property for residential 
purposes, constituted a breach of those Restrictive Covenants. 
B. Constitutional Protections Require That The Causes Of Action Arising From 
Brighton's Breach Of The Terms Of The Restrictive Covenants Must Survive The 
Condemnation Action. 
As previously argued, the District Court erred when it absolved Brighton of any possible 
breaches of the Restrictive Covenants by virtue of the School District's condemnation of the 
Property. In executing the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Brighton and Hams voluntarily bound 
themselves to and by certain contractual rights and obligations, as was their constitutionally 
protected right. Well-settled constitutional law establishes a constitutionally-protected right of 
private parties to maintain interests in contract rights freely and without any unreasonable 
restraint by the state. U.S. Const. amend. V, XIV; Idaho Const. art. I, 5 16; See also Board of 
Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). "It is clear that, in Idaho, parties to a 
contract have a property interest in the subject matter of the contract that is protectable both 
under the Contract Clause [Idaho Const. Art. I, 5 161 and the Due Process Clause of the United 
States Constitution." Curr v. Cuvr, 124 Idaho 686,691-692,864 P.2d 132, 137-138 (1993). It is 
clear, then, that no act of govermnent can ipso facto eliminate a cause of action between private 
parties for breach of a valid and enforceable contract. 
In the context of restrictive covenants, courts have held these contractual obligations to 
be enforceable even when the government's power of eminent domain interferes with the 
restrictive covenants. Crayder v. Seidman, 87 Pa. D. & C. 118 (Pa. Com. P1. 1953). 
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A restrictive covenant cannot be held to restrict the power of 
eminent domain but, where there is an act of an individual in an 
attempt to evade the restriction, and because a public body is given 
a gift, does that force the conclusion that ipso facto the right to 
enforce the restriction evaporates? 
One to whom land has been conveyed under an enforcible [sic] 
restriction, will not be permitted to avoid the full force and effect 
of the restriction by evasion. 
Id. at 126, 128. To the extent that the power of eminent domain might be used as a tool for 
parties to evade their contractual obligations, as the District Court has allowed Brighton to do, it 
is a violation of section 16 of article I of the Idaho Constitution, which prohibits any "law 
impairing the obligation of contracts." 
To be clear, the question here is not, as Brighton has attempted to convey, whether 
Brighton violated the Restrictive Covenants after the property was acquired and condemned by 
the School District. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 23-25.) Rather, as Harris has maintained at all 
times, the question is whether Brighton breached the terms of the Restrictive Covenants when it 
conveyed the land to an entity that it knew planned to improve the Property in a manner 
inconsistent with the Restrictive Covenants? (See R. Vol. 1, pp. 83-85 (Counts One, Two and 
Three of Harris's Third Party Complaint).) In other words, should Brighton be liable for 
damages arising out of a breach founded on its intentional evasion of its contractual obligations? 
(Tr. p. 119, Ll. 6-23.) Since the District Court did not analyze Hanis's breach of contract causes 
of action as actually pled, this question was never addressed and is, therefore, ripe for remand. 
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Moreover, to the extent that the District Court did extinguish Harris's causes of action 
relative to the Restrictive Covenants by reliance on the condemnation proceeding, it did so in 
error. The existence of the Restrictive Covenants in the Purchase and Sale Agreement were 
terms as material to the contract as was the purchase price, itself. (See R. Exhibit 1, pp. 2-3, T/ 9, 
Ex. 8; Simmons Aff.) Just as it would be constitutionally impermissible for the District Court to 
have nullified any outstanding balance due and owing from Brighton to Harris from the purchase 
price of the property, it is equally impermissible to summarily dismiss Brighton's other 
obligations simply because an entity with the appropriate power later condemns the Restrictive 
Covenants. (Tr. p. 171, L. 13 - p. 172, L. 14.) The District Court acknowledged this truth in the 
example of the outstanding balance, but nevertheless denied Harris the opportunity to pursue its 
rights under the other material terms of the Purchase and Sale Agreement. (Id.) Harris should 
have the opportunity to seek damages associated with Brighton's intentional avoidance and/or 
breach of the Restrictive Covenants. Accordingly, the District Court's decision must be reversed 
as to the survival of Harris's causes of action sounding in breach of contract, as the District Court 
impermissibly nullified Harris's contractual rights without due process. 
C. Harris Has A Valid Cause Of Action Against Brighton For Breach Of The Covenant 
Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing. 
In its attempt to deflect liability for a probable breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, Brighton attempts to assert a rule of law that is both overbroad and 
inconsistent with well-settled American jurisprudence. Significantly, Brighton's reliance on this 
Court's 2009 decision in Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764,203 P.3d 694 (2009), 
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is misplaced. The rule of law that Respondent seemingly contends is established by Bushi (and 
certain earlier decisions) is a much broader interpretation than what this Court has actually ruled. 
Assuming for the moment that Brighton is correct in its argument that the express terms of the 
contract do not contain the restrictions contended by Harris, or that Harris cannot prove a breach 
of those Restrictive Covenants, Brighton appears to argue that the lack of such express terms or 
express breach renders it impossible for Harris to sustain a cause of action for a breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 29-30.) This is similar to the 
tactic Brighton used below, attempting to "throw the baby out with the bathwater" by merely 
equivocating Count Four of Harris's Third Party Complaint (Breach of the Covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing) with Counts One, Two and Three (Termination, Specific Performance 
and Disgorgement of Profits, respectively). (See R. Exhibit 3, pp. 4-9; Brighton's Dismissal 
Memo.;seealsoTr.p. 89,L.21-p.91,L. 19.) 
Below, as now, Brighton asserted generally that Count Four ought to be dismissed, but 
did not discuss or substantively address, from a factual or legal standpoint, the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. (R. Exhibit 3, pp. 4-9; Brighton's Dismissal Memo.) Brighton 
went on to argue at oral argument that "Counts 1,2, 3, and essentially 4 as well" all ought to be 
dismissed under the same theory advanced by Brighton: Since no express term of the contract 
limited Brighton's sale of the property to an entity it knew would violate the restrictive 
covenants, there cannot be a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
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fair dealing. (Tr. p. 89, L. 21 - p. 91, L. 19.) Evidently, and over Harris's objections, the 
District Court followed suit2 (R. Vol. U, pp. 250C - 250D.) 
The scope of Bushi and the other cited case law on this issue is not, however, as Brighton 
has contended. Rather, Bushi is and should be consistent with the Ninth Circuit case, Vylene 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Nauglis, 90 F.3d 1472 (9th Cir. 1996), which held that the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing applies to contracts even where there is no explicit or express contract term 
that is overtly breached by the defendant. 90 F.3d at 1477. In Vylene, the Ninth Circuit 
determined that the defendant franchisor had breached the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing under a franchise agreement when it constructed "a competing restaurant within a 
mile and a half of Vylene's restaurant," even though "Vylene did not have any rights to 
exclusive territory under the [express] terms of the franchise agreement." Vylene, 90 F.3d at 
1477 (citing Scheck v. Burger King Gorp., 756 F .  Supp. 543 (S.D. Fla. 1991)). In Vylene, despite 
Harris initially argued the difference between an action in breach of contract and an action in 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in its Opposition to Brighton's 
Motion to Dismiss. (R. Exhibit 4, p. 9; Harris Family Limited Partnership's Corrected 
Memorandum in Opposition to Brighton Investments LLC's Motion to Dismiss ("Harris 
Dismissal Opposition").) Notably, the District Court's Order on Brighton's Motion to Dismiss 
neither mentions, analyzes, nor specifically dismisses Harris's cause of action for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (R. Voi. U, p. 250D.) Rather, it dismisses "the 
claims for breach of the purchase agreement, intentional interference with prospective economic 
gain, and fraud . . . ." (Id.) The District Court's general conclusion, however, was an all- 
inclusive grant of Brighton's motion to dismiss. (Id. at 250E.) Even after Harris, in its Motion 
for Reconsideration of the District Court's Order of dismissal, again noted the distinction 
between a breach of contract and a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
(R. Exhibit 6, p. 6; Memorandum in Support of Defendant/Connterclaimant/Third Party Plaintiff 
Harris Family Limited Partnership's Motion for Reconsideration ("Harris Reconsideration 
Memo.")), the District Court rejected the Motion wholesale without any additional analysis. 
(R. Vol. 11, pp. 329A - 329C.) 
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the lack of an express protection in the contract, it was held that the plaintiff "was still entitled to 
expect that the [defendant] would 'not act to destroy the right of the [plaintiff] to enjoy the fruits 
of the contract."' Id. (quoting Scheck, 756 F. Supp. at 549.) 
Applying the Ninth Circuit's reasoning to the case at bar, it is entirely possible for 
Brighton to have breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in the Purchase 
and Sale Agreement even ifthe finder of fact does not detennine that any of the express terms of 
the contract were specifically breached. CJ: Vylene, 90 F.3d at 1477. This proposition is 
supported by this Court's decision in Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 118 Idaho 664, 799 P.2d 70 
(1990), wherein it was decided that a cause of action based on the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing could be sustained even though the plaintiff therein could not maintain a cause 
of action based on breach of contract. 118 Idaho at 669-670. While the District Court here 
found that Brighton's "knowledge of a likely breach in the future is not a breach that gives rise to 
a cause of action" for breach of the express terms of the contract (R. Vol. 11, p. 250C), it does not 
follow that Harris's claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing should be 
eliminated therewith. CJ: Vylene, 90 F.3d at 1477. 
As noted, this Court's decision in Bushi, and thus the relevant Idaho law on this cause of 
action, does not run contrary to the rule established by the Ninth Circuit in Vylene: "No covenant 
will be implied which is contrary to the terms of the contract negotiated and executed by the 
parties." Bushi, 146 Idaho at 768 (emphasis added) (quoting Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss 
Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266,824 P.2d 841 (1991)). Thus, if the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing is not contrary to the express terms of the contract, Bushi will have no negating 
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effect on the claim. The evidence of record, as presented below, establishes that a reasonable 
juror could determine that Brighton acted in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing when it sold the property to a buyer that it knew would engage in activity that ran 
afoul of the Restrictive Covenants. Dismissal of this claim was, therefore, inappropriate. 
Notably, Bushi also includes an implicit declaration that is of even greater help to 
Harris's position in this appeal. As stated by this Court, "a violation of the covenant occurs only 
when 'either party . . . violates, nullifies or simificantly impairs anv benefit of the . . . contract 
. . .."' Id. (emphasis added); see also Sorensen, 118 Idaho at 669. In the present case, the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing that Harris contends is a part of the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement is not contrary to the express terms, but is merely a covenant that exists in addition lo 
and independent of those terms. Under Brighton's characterization of Bushi, an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing would never exist in a contract unless it was expressly 
stated - an interpretation that is logically inconsistent with the very nature of an implied 
covenant. Contrastingly, this Court indicated that had the appellant in Bushi been able to "show 
that Respondents violated, nullified, or signzjkantly impaired the operating agreement," he also 
would have been able to sustain an argument that the respondents "acted in breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Id. (emphasis added). Ergo, if Harris is able to show 
that Brighton's actions "significantly impaired" the benefits that were intended to inure to Harris 
under the Restrictive Covenants, Harris can maintain an action for breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing insofar as is necessary to withstand summary judgment andor 
dismissal. Bushi, 203 P.3d at 768-769. This issue should be remanded to the District Court. 
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D. Harris's Claim For Unjust Enrichment Against Brighton Must Survive If The 
District Court's Dismissal Of The Breach Of Contract Actions Is Upheld. 
Harris initially notes that the record below reveals that the District Court was convinced, 
even before Brighton's Motion for Summary Judgment on Harris's claim for unjust enrichment 
was filed, that Harris's sole remedy for any damages it sustained from these transactions was 
limited to severance damages from the condemnation action. (Tr. p. 172, L. 23 - p. 173, L. 5.) 
\ 
In saying this, the District Court acknowledged that those severance damages were intended to 
compensate for "the value of Harris' other property [which] was diminished by the 
condemnation of the covenant." (Id. (emphasis added).) What the District Court failed to 
recognize at that stage, and what Respondent fails to recognize now, however, is that Harris's 
claim for unjust enrichment was not aimed at receiving compensation for damage to its other 
property, as caused by the loss of the enjoyment of the Restrictive Covenants. Instead, the claim 
for unjust enrichment seeks compensation for Brighton's unfair gain in purchasing the 21.54 
acres of property subject to restrictive covenants, yet selling the same property as if those same 
restrictions did not exist3 (Tr. p. 235, L. 22 - p. 236, L. 22.) Accordingly, Brighton's argument 
The difference here is easily illustrated by a diagram consisting of two concentric circles: All 
area within the inside circle represents the damages claimed by Harris on account of the unjust 
enrichment enjoyed by Brighton and associated with the 21.54 acres conveyed by Brighton and 
condemned by the school. The value assigned to those damages, according to Appellant's 
expert, is $2,250,000.00. (R. Exhibit 15, p. 2, 7 2, Ex. A; Affidavit of Paul R. Hyde, EA, 
MCBA, ASA, MAT, in Opposition to Brighton Investments, LLC's Motion for Summary 
Judgment ("Hyde Aff.").) All area within the outside circle (excluding the inside circle) 
represents the incidental damages claimed by Harris (and now determined) on account of 
severance damages associated with damage to Harris's remaining, surrounding property. The 
value assigned to those damages, per the settlement between Harris and the School District, is 
$1 75,000.00. 
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that Harris has already received an adequate remedy at law, based on the condemnation action, 
wholly misses the distinction between the separate wrongs asserted by Harris for damage to 
separate interests and for which separate standards and awards of damages apply. (Tr. p. 240, 
L. 25 - p. 242, L. 1 .) 
In its brief, Brighton essentially tracks the same position taken by the District Court in its 
Order granting summary judgment in hvor of Brighton. (Compare Respondent's Brief, p. 35 
with R. Vol. 11, p. 400.) Particularly, Brighton argues that Harris has failed to satisfy the prima 
facie elements of a claim for unjust enrichment, as established by Vanderford Co. v. Knudson, 
144 Idaho 547, 165 P.3d 261 (2007). (Id.) However, as argued by Harris below, each of the 
three elements has been sufficiently established so as to preclude entry of summary judgment 
and,therefore, now warrant reversal of the District Court on this issue. (Tr. p. 235, L. 22 - 
p. 237, L. 22.) Vanderford requires that a plaintiff in an unjust enrichment claim establish 
"(1) there was a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the 
defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be 
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the value 
thereof." Vanderford, 144 Idaho at 558. In order, the evidence presented to the District Court by 
Harris established all of the required elements: 
(1) The benefit conferred upon Brighton by Harris was the sale of the Property at a 
market price that was burdened by the restrictive covenants and, thus, lower than 
if the Restrictive Covenants did not exist (R. Exhibit 15, p. 2, fi 2, Ex. A, p. 17-19; 
Hyde Aff.; see also R. Exhibit 13, p. 6,fi 16; Harris Family Limited Partnership's 
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Separate Statement of Material Facts in Opposition to Brighton Investments, 
LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Harris Statement of Facts")); 
(2) Brighton appreciated the above-noted benefit as conferred by Harris by virtue of 
its purchase of the Property at a market price that was burdened by the restrictive 
covenants. (R. Exhibit 15, p. 2 , 7  2, Ex. A, p. 17-19; Hyde Aff.) Brighton further 
appreciated the benefit when it was able to convey the property to the State Board 
of Education on behalf of Boise State University at a combined sale and gift value 
as if the Property was not burdened by the Restrictive Covenants and, thus, at a 
market price much higher than if the Property was burdened (Id.); and 
(3) Under these circumstances, where Brighton was able to purchase the Property at a 
value burdened by the Restrictive Covenants and then sell the Property at a value 
as if such burdens did not exist, based on its knowledge that the buyer's plan was 
to ultimately nullify the Restrictive Covenants, it would be inequitable for 
Brighton to enjoy the full benefit of the increased sale price without any 
compensation to Harris. (Tr. p. 242, L. 6 - p. 243, L. 4.) 
Because Hams established all of the facts required to support a claim for unjust 
enrichment, the case should be remanded for a trial on this claim. 
111. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL 
Given the arguments and authorities contained in Harris's briefing on appeal, the District 
Court erred in granting Brighton's Motions to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment. This case 
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ought to be remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with remand 
instructions from this Court. Thus, on appeal, Brighton is not the prevailing party in this appeal 
and is, therefore, not entitled to costs or attorney fees under Idaho Appellate Rules 40 or 41, nor 
under any other relevant statutory or contractual provision. As this case is appropriate for 
remand, thus reviving some or all of Harris's causes of action against Brighton, Harris is the 
prevailing party and is entitled to the fees and costs allowable under Idaho Appellate Rules 40 
and 41, Idaho Code 5 12-120, and the Purchase and Sale Agreement between the parties. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, together with the arguments and authorities contained within 
Appellant's opening brief, Harris maintains that its Third Party Complaint states valid causes of 
action against Brighton sounding in breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. Furthermore, genuine issues of material fact exist, which ought to 
have precluded the entry of summary judgment, with respect to Harris's claim against Brighton 
for unjust enrichment. Accordingly, Harris respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
decisions of the District Court on Brighton's Motion to Dismiss and its Motion for Summary 
Judgment, to remand this case back to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with 
such a reversal, for an award to Harris of the reasonable attorney fees and costs associated with 
this appeal, and for such other relief as this Court deems just and proper. 
Ill 
Ill 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1 lth day of March, 2010. 
GREENER BURKEi SHOEMAKER, P.A. 
Richard H. Greener 
Fredric V. Shoemaker 
Thomas J. Lloyd I11 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 900 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 3 19-2600 
Facsimile: (208) 319-2601 
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